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INTRODUCTION
The way in which school districts are governed has long been a topic of interest and
controversy. While there are broadly differing opinions about which governing structures to
implement and how, the most important thing to note might be the widespread discontent. Just as
student achievement is a result of many factors, both at home and in the classroom, activists and
politicians have sought to change any number of educational policies—including school district
governance—in an attempt to bolster student outcomes. This drive has sparked the debate
surrounding school boards, the governing authority in charge of policy decisions at the local level.
A motivation for writing this paper was the introduction of Assembly Bill 339 of the
Nevada Legislature’s seventy-eighth session (2015). This education bill, introduced by
Assemblyman Pat Hickey, died in committee. It made a relatively modest proposal to introduce a
conversation about transitioning to a mixed school board; it was met with widespread opposition.
However, many legislators and parents across the country continue to debate the merits of
appointed and elected school boards, wondering which induces better outcomes for children. In
this paper, I will discuss the context for the transition from elected to appointed school boards,
which usually occurs after a scandal or loss of public trust (Milliard, 2015). I will then explore
which type of board is better for student outcomes; though the type of board does not seem to make
a difference, elected school boards do seem to exacerbate unfavorable conditions for diverse
representation on the board, which can hinder student achievement. I then go on to explore the
issue of whether elected or appointed boards are more accountable. What the research suggests is
that, although directly electing board members may initially seem a better system for
accountability, the turnout for school board elections is incredibly low. By contrast, the turnout is
much higher for mayoral and gubernatorial elections (Milliard, 2015). When the school board is
appointed by the mayor or governor, members can advance the education policy agenda of a single,
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identifiable and accountable figure. For these reasons, an appointed school board may actually
promote conditions of greater accountability and greater student outcomes.
Yet the fact remains that the research does not strongly suggest that either type of board
makes a substantial impact on student outcomes or board member accountability overall; the
conditions promoted by appointed boards may simply lend themselves to better outcomes. For this
reason I explore the impact of school district size. Nevada’s Clark County school district is the
nation’s fifth largest school district by enrollment (Milliard, 2015). This prompted me to explore
the effects of district size on the communities within said district, and what I found was alarming.
The research suggests that the larger a school district, the less accessible the board members are to
the community (Battersby & Fischel, 2006). This not only decreases accountability, but also
hinders communication and cooperation between the school board members and the communities
they serve. Furthermore, student outcomes are better in smaller districts; this is seen in both student
attendance and student test scores (Driscoll, Halcoussis & Svorny, 2003; Jones, Toma & Zimmer,
2008).
Finally, I discuss how school district deconsolidation leads to greater efficiency. The
research shows that large, urban school districts create diseconomies of scale. Though it may be
economically efficient to consolidate small, rural districts, after a certain threshold school
management becomes more inefficient (Taylor, Gronberg, Jansen & Karakaplan, 2014). This is
because levels of bureaucracy necessary for managing large districts create distance between
students, parents, and administrative figures; the adverse effects of this distance are felt most by
minority students. For these reasons, I conclude that while appointed school boards may encourage
conditions beneficial for students and parents, school district deconsolidation holds the potential
to improve outcomes for those students and parents.
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Context for Understanding the Path from Elected to Appointed School Boards
Since voting is seen as a hallmark of democracy, elected school boards have historically
been more popular than appointed; electing all members of a school board is the default practice,
with 93% of all school boards being elected as of 2002 (BallotPedia, n.d.). However, there has
been a large effort to reform the way schools and districts are governed, with many states moving
to appointed or even mixed boards in which some members are elected and others are appointed,
usually by the state’s governor or a city’s mayor. Kenneth Wong, Brown University’s chair of
education policy, explains that usually, the catalyst for moving to an appointed school board
system is “the elected board’s mismanagement causing poor student performance, financial crises,
teacher shortages or infighting with the superintendent” (as cited in Milliard, 2015). In other words,
when the elected board loses the public’s trust, there is often a push to change the system of
governance, with the simplest solution being to switch to an appointed school board.

APPOINTED V ELECTED BOARDS
Appointed Boards and Student Outcomes
One of the primary concerns when debating the merits of appointed school boards over
elected boards is the impact on student achievement. Some argue that mayor-appointed boards can
improve student achievement (Milliard, 2015). However, the research on this appears to be
inconclusive. The Guinn Center found that the type of school board—whether elected, appointed,
or hybrid—seems to make “no significant difference” in student achievement (2015).
In my own analysis, I sought to compare student outcomes in terms of per pupil spending.
I found the Top 10 largest school districts in the country by per pupil spending in 2017, as
determined by the U.S. Census Bureau (2019). Using information published on BallotPedia, I
found that there appears to be no correlation between the type of school board—elected, appointed,
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or mixed—and the amount of money spent per pupil, as is shown in Figure 1. This is important to
note because more spending per pupil is generally linked with better student outcomes, as this
usually indicates that students are privy to more resources than those in areas where less money is
spent per pupil.
Table 1: TOP 10 LARGEST SCHOOL DISTRICTS
BY PER PUPIL SPENDING (2017)
District

School Board Type

New York City, NY

Appointed

Boston, MA

Appointed

Baltimore, MD

Mixed

Montgomery County, MD

Elected

Howard County, MD

Elected

Prince Georges County, MD

Mixed

Columbus, OH

Elected

Fairfax County, VA

Elected

Hawaii Public Schools, HI

Appointed

Atlanta, GA

Elected

The type of school board does not seem to affect per pupil spending, and the Guinn Center
found no significant link between student outcomes and the type of school board (2015). However,
they did find that the degree to which board members are “representative of the students they
serve” is linked to student achievement. Areas where the board members are more representative
of the students saw better student outcomes; Meier and Stewart have found this to be especially
true in their studies of Latinx students (as cited in Guinn Center, 2015). Though it may not appear
that student outcomes are affected by whether a board is elected or appointed, the research seems
to suggest that board members that look like the students they represent better ensure that their
students’ needs are being met.

7
Some may argue that elected school boards are more representative school boards, but the
research shows that this is not the case. In fact, it has been found that in elected boards, “[s]chool
board members are disproportionately likely to come from wealthier, whiter, and more educated
neighborhoods within districts” (Mahnken, 2019). That is, those elected to school boards are not
usually representative of the average resident within the school district. This is likely due to the
costs, both in terms of finances and time, that come with running for an elected board. These are
costs that less wealthy and usually less white individuals cannot afford.
The lack of representation in school boards is alarming because under these conditions, the
results of school board elections can exacerbate existing problems of inequity in student outcomes
and resources within districts. Mahnken asserts that “privileging the input of the wealthy and wellconnected can contribute to equity problems between schools” (2019). Schools within wealthier
areas usually see better student outcomes and greater per pupil spending than their less wealthy
counterparts. Not only is this due to the greater resources at their disposal, but also because
“wealthy and well-connected” parents tend to be more involved in their children’s education, both
in and out of the classroom. By promoting conditions that favor certain, more privileged
individuals, school board elections can create greater distance between board members and many
of the communities they represent, as well as make school boards less representative and diverse,
which adversely affects students—especially students of color. This issue can be combated by
implementing an appointed school board, but only if the appointing party ensures that the school
board is representative of the community.
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Appointed Boards may Create Better Systems of Accountability
One argument for having an appointed rather than elected school board is that it may create
a system of greater accountability. Since education policies are usually under the purview of local
boards and communities, it may sound counterintuitive that a board appointed by the mayor or
governor would be more accountable than one elected directly by the constituents. Yet Epstein
(2004) notes that “governors, together with state legislators, have been primary forces in school
policy for a generation…[o]ne would be hard pressed, however, to find governors who are blamed
when academic weakness continues” (p. 3). Even when constituents elect their school board
members, those members are usually implementing the governor’s policies. If policies do not bring
about adequate results, the board members are punished by the voters, not the official that created
the failed policies. This creates a failed system of accountability; it is illogical to punish or reward
a body for policies they largely took no part in writing.
By contrast, appointed school board members advance policies to reflect the interests of
the appointing official. Epstein explains that “[g]ubernatorial or mayoral control certainly is not a
cure-all for education….[t]he point is that such direct political control would provide much greater
visibility and accountability for academic results” (p. 5). If a mayor or governor aids in creating
education policy and appoints the members of the board responsible for implementing that policy,
the public knows who they should hold accountable. Board members appointed by the mayor or
governor—who already plays a large role in education policy—will reflect the will of the
appointing official. The appointing official can then be held responsible by the voters according to
the success of his or her policies.
Furthermore, it is more likely that a mayor will be held responsible for school outcomes at
the voting booth than a school board member will. As pointed out by Wong, “mayoral elections
tend to have about a 50 percent turnout compared to the 5 percent turnout of many school board
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elections” (as cited in Milliard, 2015). Since a much larger proportion of the population participate
in electing the mayor—who oftentimes is responsible for appointing school board members where
applicable—than in electing school board members, it can be said that having an appointed school
board may arguably be more democratic than having an elected school board.
However, this claim is often met with opposition from those who believe directly electing
their board members is more democratic. This was the reigning opinion in Nevada when
Assemblyman Pat Hickey introduced Assembly Bill 339 during the seventy-eighth session of the
Nevada legislature (2015). The bill simply proposed that a public hearing be held in order to
discuss adopting a mixed school board model if certain conditions are met, such as: discrepancies
in the budget, the receipt of a petition signed by at least ten percent of electors, or if the school
district receives the lowest performance rating for two years in a row, according to the statewide
system. These are all concerns that have triggered the transition from an elected to appointed or
hybrid school boards in other districts. AB 339 only required a public hearing be held in order to
consider the transition for Nevada districts, yet the bill died in committee. During the meeting of
the Assembly Committee on Education, Nevada assembly members, community leaders, and even
a Nevada student expressed opposition to the bill.
The majority of those concerned expressed that they felt appointing rather than electing
school board members takes power away from the voters. Assemblywoman Swank expressed that
she was “not sure how [AB 339] does anything but decrease those parents’ input on how their
schools are run” (Nevada Legislature, 2015, p. 11). This sentiment was echoed by Cara Strasser,
a private citizen with children in the school system at the time. She stated: “I do not think that
because a couple of events occurred that were not good should constitute a knee-jerk reaction to
change how we set things, take away rights from the local people and give it to more government,
and bring someone in from the state who represents the state’s interest and maybe not the people”
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(Nevada Legislature, 2015, pp. 15-16). Strasser expresses a concern that if school board members
are appointed, they will not be accountable to the people, but to the state’s interest. If the members
were appointed by the governor, then they would represent the governor’s plans for education.
However, this is already the case in most districts, where the governor hands down education
policy to be implemented by the board. Furthermore, voters turn out in higher numbers to elect the
board’s appointing actor, whether that be the governor or the mayor. Therefore, even if the board
represents the “state’s interest,” it would still represent the voters’ interest. One might say that this
is not in fact an issue of accountability, but of accessibility.

SCHOOL DISTRICT DECONSOLIDATION
Smaller Districts Promote Accessibility
One way in which school board members can be made more accessible to the voters is by
deconsolidating large school districts. Battersby and Fischel (2006) find that “very large school
districts are governed without much input from the voters, and research has suggested that very
large districts respond more to teacher unions than to parental and voter concerns” (p. 7). It appears
that, since board members in large school districts represent a wide variety of people, it is difficult
for individuals to get in touch with their board members, and it is difficult for board members to
hear individual concerns. Because teacher unions are generally more effective at organizing and
better connected than parents, such organizations have the ear of board members, rather than the
majority of the people that members are meant to represent.
Furthermore, large school districts are less apt to address specific local concerns. Because
large districts include such a wide geographic space and are more likely to house a diverse group
of inhabitants, they cannot possibly implement district-wide reforms that will take into account
every need of every group. As Robertson (2007) explains, “[b]uilding upon the theory…that
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diseconomies of scale result from the inability of large districts to adapt to specific local needs, it
is likely that districts that are composed of subgroups with diverse socioeconomic and cultural
backgrounds will demonstrate greater variability in specific academic needs” (p. 626). That is,
most students living in a majority-white area will not have the same needs as students in a heavily
English Language Learner area, and students in an impoverished area will not have the same needs
as students living in wealthy areas. If all of these groups are housed within the same school district,
the district will not be able to effectively address all of their needs. For this reason, it appears that
smaller school districts may be better able to tailor their practices and policies to the unique needs
of their communities.
It is also a problem that as school districts grow, school board members and other
authorities become further removed from their constituents. In order to help manage the
responsibilities of a school district, layers of bureaucracy must be put in place according to the
district size. However, each layer of bureaucracy becomes an additional hurdle that parents and
students must overcome in order to contact their representatives. Robertson (2007) explains that
“teachers, parents, and students in large districts display lower motivation and involvement than
those in smaller districts and attributed this to the loss of personalization inherent with bureaucratic
organization structures” (p. 622). The bureaucracy necessary to run a large school district not only
reduces the accessibility of school board members and other school authorities, but this lack of
accessibility has real consequences for student achievement.
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Smaller Districts Promote Student Achievement
Overwhelmingly, research has shown that larger school districts are detrimental to student
outcomes. One way in which this is seen is through student attendance. Jones, Toma, and Zimmer
(2008) suggested that “class size, the size of high schools, and the size of school districts are
inversely related to the rate at which enrolled students attend school” (p. 147). Though it has long
been discussed that smaller classes and schools are better for student achievement, the authors
presented a startling finding: students attend class less in larger school districts. Attendance rates
were critical factors concerning student grades and graduation rates. If students did not attend
class, they could not learn, and they could not graduate. This is a strong incentive to deconsolidate
larger school districts, for attendance lessens as school district size increases.
The negative impact of large school district size is seen not only through student
attendance, but also through student achievement. Driscoll, Halcoussis, and Svorny (2003) explain
that “[b]eing too big leads to inefficiencies in service provision and management” (p. 195). This
is true of any service provider, including schools. This means that as district size increases, the
quality of education afforded to students decreases and it becomes more difficult to oversee
teachers and implement necessary reforms. These inefficiencies in service provision are reflected
in student test scores, one measure of student achievement. Driscoll et al. found that “district size
has a negative effect on student performance, as measured by standardized test scores” (2003, p.
200). This would suggest that the deconsolidation of large districts can produce better student
outcomes, as measured by test scores.
The need to deconsolidate large districts becomes more urgent when one considers students
of lower socioeconomic status, who disproportionately feel the effects of district size. Abbott,
Joireman, and Stroh found that “the negative relationship between school poverty and achievement
is stronger in larger districts” (2002, p.14). It has already been established that larger school
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districts negatively impact student achievement. However, this fact is compounded in
impoverished students. They see more pronounced negative effects due to large districts; this is
unconscionable as these students already face greater challenges and lower scores than their
wealthier counterparts.
The idea that low income students are better served in smaller districts is echoed by
Hannaway and Kimball of the U.S. Department of Education in Big Isn’t Always Bad: School
District Size, Poverty, and Standards-Based Reform (1998). As the title would suggest, this report
was written in support of large school districts. However, the authors admit that “districts serving
students from poor backgrounds may benefit less from large size in making reform progress” (p.
12). The way school districts improve is by adapting and implementing necessary reforms.
However, poor students do not get the care and reform they need within larger school districts.
Poor students are perhaps those who need school reform the most.
Even if large school districts may make some reform progress, as posited by Hannaway
and Kimball, Diane Ravitch (1998) of the Brookings Institution explains that this does not
necessarily mean schools are making progress. Largely discrediting Hannaway and Kimball’s
claims, Ravitch states that large districts “have mastered the art of continual reform, loudly
trumpeting the latest initiative, even though these heralded reforms do not produce significant
change in the educational outcomes for children.” Even though they tout the implementation of
reforms, which Hannaway and Kimball state can be done with more ease in larger districts, such
reforms do not actually improve the quality of education for children in these districts. This
problem is only exacerbated by the degree of removal between parents and school authorities in
big districts.
Ravitch (1998) explains why more reforms in larger districts do not actually translate to
better conditions for students. She asserts that “large bureaucracies that are responsible for urban
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schools seem incapable of effective management…Big-city school bureaucracies often seem to
adopt self-serving strategies that protect administrative jobs rather than children.” That is, large
bureaucracies do not better manage schools. It appears from my analysis of the literature to date
that students are not the priority. Rather, large systems of bureaucracy find ways to implement
“reforms” that only serve to keep the same, inefficient structures in place. As time passes, this web
of reform only becomes more difficult to untangle, and students are no better for it. Constituents
become further and further removed from those who are meant to serve them, and the “self-serving
strategies” implemented by administrations make it difficult to clear away the clutter of
bureaucracy and move towards a more efficient system.
Smaller Districts Promote Efficiency
Finally, some are in favor of school district deconsolidation because it leads to greater
efficiency. One way we can measure efficiency is through costs of operation. Many rural school
districts were consolidated in order to pool resources and cut costs in serving a relatively small
number of students. However, Taylor, Gronberg, Jansen, and Karakaplan (2014) found that “as
the size of the consolidated district increases past 3,200 students, costs are expected to rise, not
fall” (p. iii). Costs increase for larger school districts, as more money is needed to operate more
levels of bureaucracy and a greater number of administrative jobs. This not only increases the
operational costs, but also hinders effective communication.
Large school districts are also less effective because they lack competition. In a simulation
of Texas school districts, it was found that “competitive pressure leads to greater school district
efficiency in Texas, so any consolidation is expected to lead to a loss of school district efficiency”
(Taylor et al., 2014, p. iii). When there are multiple school districts within an area, those districts
are essentially competing to entice families into joining their district. They do this by providing
better services, which in this case is education. This means that schools have reason to be more
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cost-efficient, or make their money go further. Rather than spending on unnecessary programs or
bureaucratic bloat, schools are more likely to invest in students, which is reflected in test scores,
extracurricular activities, and services offered to students. All of this is done to beat the
competition—in this case, other school districts within the same area. This competition is lacking
in large school districts, for they have few or no other districts to compete with, and therefore no
incentive to maximize their spending efficiency.
Having many small districts in competition with each other not only provides the necessary
conditions to promote increased efficiency in all districts, but it also does the important work of
increasing parent choice. In an area composed of only one large school district, such as Clark
County, families do not have a choice in their district. They must take it or leave. If large districts
are deconsolidated, families can instead shop around for a district that better suits their needs and
preferences, as well as those of their students.

CONCLUSION
Though debate has long raged about the way to improve school management and outcomes,
there seems to be no silver-bullet answer. The only certainty is the apparent ubiquity of the
dissatisfaction with the school system. However, certain policies can be implemented to improve
conditions for students and their parents. Appointed school boards may be one such policy. Though
electing or appointed school board members does not conclusively lead to better student outcomes,
elected board members do seem to be wealthier and whiter than the average citizen they are meant
to represent. This is important because the diversity and representativeness of school board
members does impact student outcomes. The discrepancy can be corrected by appointing board
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members if the appointing body ensures that the members look more like the average person they
represent.
Furthermore, appointed boards may lead to greater accountability. If board members
respond to an appointing mayor or governor, the mayor or governor responds to the people. The
much higher voter turnout in mayoral and gubernatorial races than in school board races means
the school board members as well as the appointing official may be more accountable to voters
than if board members were directly elected.
The deconsolidation of large urban school districts can also promote better conditions for
students and parents. This is because board members for smaller districts are more accessible to
parents and students. Smaller districts also see better student attendance and test scores (Driscoll
et al., 2003; Jones et al., 2008). Finally, smaller districts are more efficient because they generally
have fewer levels of bureaucracy and must compete for parent choice (Taylor et al., 2014). Though
there is no guarantee that these policies will greatly impact student outcomes everywhere, they do
present the opportunity to create more responsive systems of school management in order to better
serve parents and the students they advocate for.
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